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Prior empirical evidence finds that general enrollment effects of merit-aid programs such as the
Georgia Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) scholarship are large and significant,
while the effects of need-based aid programs such as the Pell grant are modest and often insignificant.
This paper uses new panel data on Pell awards to examine the influence of the Georgia HOPE
scholarship on needy-student enrollments. We demonstrate that the introduction of merit aid in
Georgia generally improves the college access of needy students and has been leveraged into greater
federal Pell assistance. While institution-specific increases in both Pell enrollment and funding are
largest at two-year and less selective four-year institutions, the results suggest that Pell students are
not crowded out of more selective schools by HOPE’s intent to retain the best Georgia high school
students, as might have been anticipated.
JEL Classification: I21, I28, J24
1. Introduction
There is increasing concern by policy makers and administrators regarding the access of
financially needy students to higher education. In particular, two trends with regard to need-based aid
have been documented as critical—Pell grants representing a decreasing share of the average financial
aid package (Ehrenberg 2000) and students increasingly relying on unsubsidized loans to finance
college (Duffy and Goldberg 1998; McPherson and Schapiro 1998; Dynarski 2003). Concurrently,
state governments and universities have begun to place greater emphasis on non–need-based aid in an
attempt to attract and retain the best students (McPherson and Schapiro 1994). Since receiving federal
need-based aid often precedes and precludes receipt of other forms of state aid, non–need-based aid
programs such as Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) scholarship afford
a relative advantage to the financially well to do (e.g., Clotfelter 2004). The purpose of this paper is to
examine whether and how the introduction of the HOPE scholarship affected the enrollment of Pell
students within the higher educational system of Georgia. This paper therefore sheds light on whether
broad-based, merit-aid programs have harmed the access objectives of needy students.
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Among state-level, non–need-based aid programs, Georgia’s HOPE scholarship is the most
generous, having dispensed over $2.7 billion in aid to more than 850,000 students since the program’s
inception in 1993. Conditional on graduating from a Georgia high school with a B average or better,
the HOPE scholarship covers tuition, fees, and book expenses for those attending Georgia public
postsecondary institutions. Overall, the HOPE scholarship represents a significant source of merit-
based financial aid within Georgia.
Existing research on the Georgia HOPE scholarship indicates that the introduction of merit-
based aid has significantly increased overall college attendance. For example, Cornwell, Mustard, and
Sridhar (2006) use Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) to show that the HOPE
scholarship has increased the college enrollment rate of first-time freshmen by roughly 6% in Georgia
relative to the surrounding southern states. Likewise, with Current Population Survey (CPS) data on
18- to 19-year-old youth, Dynarski (2004) finds that the HOPE scholarship has increased Georgia
students’ likelihoods of attending college by 7% to 9% relative to the treatment group in other
southern states. The literature, therefore, provides evidence regarding HOPE’s efficacy for broad
student populations.
In general, despite the size of the Pell program and the significant changes in the environment
facing needy students targeted by Pell resources, prior research has noted a paucity of formal evidence
associated with how the movement toward non–need-based aid has affected their access to a college
education (e.g., Balderston 1997; Clotfelter 2004). While not measuring need directly, prior work has
shown that the impact of merit aid in Georgia appears larger among relatively higher income groups
and among institutions that attract relatively well-to-do students. Specifically, Dynarski (2004) finds
a 12% post-HOPE enrollment effect for white students, but no increase in African-American
enrollments. Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006) find that the enrollment effects of HOPE are
concentrated among four-year (as opposed to two-year) institutions. Further, prior literature on Pell
enrollments also leaves some question about how responsive needy students are to increases in aid
generally and the types of institutions at which responses are potentially found (e.g., Hansen 1983;
Manski and Wise 1983; Kane 1995; Seftor and Turner 2002).
Collectively, the literature’s silence regarding the influence of merit aid on needy-student
outcomes, the size and increasing prominence of non–need-based programs, and the suggestion in the
literature that needy students may be less responsive to increases in aid, are cause for potential
concern. Using new data on annual Pell enrollments by institution that span the 1993 introduction of
HOPE (i.e., 1988 to 1997), we document differential responses to the HOPE scholarship based on
a well-defined and consistent measure of need that is exogenous to institutions. Contrary to the
findings of prior work, we find that the number of Pell recipients increased at institutions in Georgia
after HOPE, as compared with other southern universities, consistent with broad merit-based
scholarship programs improving college access for needy students.
In addition to our analysis of enrollment, we find that HOPE has differential effects on
average and total Pell receipts in Georgia relative to other southern institutions. Specifically,
the average Pell award is lower at Georgia institutions after HOPE, suggesting that HOPE draws
students of lesser need into the Pell program. Moreover, we find that total Pell revenues increase in
Georgia relative to other southern institutions after HOPE, which suggests that broad merit-
aid programs are effective at leveraging scholarships with greater federal funding paid to needy
students who may have not otherwise attended college. Contrary to the findings of Cornwell,
Mustard, and Sridhar (2006) for the broader population of college students, our analysis indicates
that institution-level increases in Pell student enrollment and Pell aid occur at both two-year and
four-year schools.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the institutional details that are pertinent
to our empirical analysis and that motivate our tests. Section 3 describes the data and empirical models
of the institutional enrollment effects of the HOPE scholarship. The observed enrollment effects of
HOPE in section 3 motivate our analysis of average and total Pell revenue accruing to Georgia
institutions, which we explore in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. Institutional Attributes of the Pell Program and the
Georgia HOPE Scholarship
To receive federal aid in the form of a Pell grant, a student must first complete a Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form, which provides financial aid administrators
with the information needed to determine the eligibility and size of an applicant’s Pell grant. The
award value is formulaic, determined by the student’s expected family contribution (EFC) and the
institution-specific cost of attendance (COA), which includes tuition, room, board, and other
expenses such as books and travel. For dependent students, the EFC is a function of parent income
and wealth and the number of siblings in college. Conditional on being above the federally
mandated minimum grant, the level of an individual student’s grant in any given year is the
minimum of (i) the difference between the federal maximum Pell grant and the student’s EFC; (ii)
the difference between the institution’s COA and the student’s EFC; and (iii) prior to 1993, 60% of
the institution’s COA.1 Given the sequential distribution of aid—federal preceding state preceding
institution—in no way is a student’s Pell status or award value dependent on state or institution aid.
Except in the case where low-cost institutions could potentially increase their COA in response to
HOPE, Pell status and award values can safely be exploited as exogenous to the introduction of
HOPE. Further, Long (2002) studies a time series of Georgia institutions spanning the introduction
of HOPE and finds no significant tuition response at public universities, which we also confirm in
our data.2
All else equal, the advent of Georgia’s HOPE scholarship increased the likelihood that the
average in-state high school student received financial aid in attending college within the State of
Georgia. It follows that the HOPE scholarship lowered the expected cost of attending Georgia
colleges and universities for the average in-state high school student. Thus, the empirical analysis tests
the expectation that the HOPE scholarship has induced a general increase in the enrollment of both
Pell and non-Pell students in Georgia, which is presented in section 3.
Given our particular interest in the prospects of needy students, two key dimensions of the
scholarship are integral to our current analysis and may have generated an asymmetric response to
HOPE across levels of need. First, over the period of our sample, low-income students were required
to complete a FAFSA, and the receipt of a Pell award preceded the HOPE scholarship and reduced its
1 The percentage cap on Pell grants was 50% from 1973 through 1984 and 60% from 1985 through 1992. Following the 1992
Higher Education Amendments, the percentage cap was abolished. Although the percentage-cap rule was changed in the same
year that HOPE was introduced, the inclusion of year indicators should absorb the effect of this policy change since it occurred
in all control states and Georgia.
2 Former Education Secretary William Bennett speculated in a 1987 New York Times article that the cost of college may not
decrease with the government provision aid if colleges and universities raise tuition in response. However, prior evidence with
regard to the Bennett hypothesis is mixed (e.g., Long 2002; Rizzo and Ehrenberg 2003; Singell and Stone 2006). Our data
suggest that if anything, tuition decreased at the average institution in Georgia following HOPE, across both four- and two-year
schools. Moreover, while we exclude tuition from our empirical model, we find that the inclusion of tuition (contemporaneous
or lagged) does not quantitatively or qualitatively affect the conclusions of the empirical analyses.
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value dollar for dollar.3 It follows that the HOPE scholarship was relatively generous to the financially
well to do, who potentially gained a merit award without the implied reduction in need-based aid.4
Second, being merit-based, HOPE is by definition relatively generous to the academically able, which
might alone be expected to expand competition over access for a given quality institution.
Accordingly, the introduction of HOPE granted to some of the most financially and academically able
high school students in Georgia a relative advantage in the financing of college by lowering their costs
of attending college in comparison with those with fewer financial resources, who were more likely to
qualify for need-based aid programs.5
While the predicted behavioral responses to HOPE are strictly at the student level, data
limitations restrict our analysis to institutions. As such, we are unable to directly address potential
asymmetries across an ex ante distribution of student ability. However, any systematic change in the
ex post distribution of college costs brought about by the introduction of the HOPE scholarship may
have nonetheless changed the distribution of needy students over the quality spectrum of universities
in Georgia.6 Specifically, the scholarship may have increased the propensity for the most academically
able students, who may otherwise have attended out-of-state schools, to remain in state and for
nonneedy but academically able students to substitute into selective, potentially higher cost
institutions within Georgia. Indeed, prior work has shown a post-HOPE improvement in the quality of
students attending Georgia institutions as measured by their relative SAT performance (e.g., Cornwell
and Mustard 2002). We examine the potential asymmetric impact of HOPE across the quality
hierarchy of Georgia institutions in section 3.
The implied enrollment effects of the HOPE on Pell recipients also have implications regarding
the average Pell award per student and total Pell revenues at Georgia institutions. Specifically, the
requirement for low-income students to complete the FAFSA to receive HOPE would tend to draw
less needy students into the pool of Pell recipients by encouraging students who might not have
applied for federal support either because they did not expect to receive a grant or because the value of
the expected grant was not sufficient to warrant the effort. It follows that HOPE might be expected to
lower the average Pell award in Georgia. On the other hand, the downward pressure on average Pell
awards might be offset by HOPE encouraging needy students to attend more costly institutions (e.g.,
four-year vs. two-year schools) that could possibly qualify them for higher Pell awards. Thus, we
examine the potential for the HOPE scholarship yielding asymmetric effects on average Pell awards
across selectivity in section 4. Finally, because the response of total Pell revenues to HOPE depends
3 In 1995, the initial requirement for all HOPE applicants to simultaneously file a FAFSA was maintained only for applicants
with household incomes below $50,000 and eliminated for others. The formal requirement to file a FAFSA in conjunction with
any HOPE application was formally lifted in 2001, outside of our sample period. The HOPE application is now completed at
little cost to applicants, with a few items of basic nature that can be entered electronically at www.gsfc.org/hope.
4 For a short time the Georgia HOPE scholarship did have a maximum household income rule. Specifically, in the first year of
the program (1993) a household income cap of $66,000 was imposed, which was raised to $100,000 the following year and
eliminated entirely thereafter. Thus, while the relative advantage exists on average, the presence of such caps would restrict any
advantage to those students with wealth high enough to not qualify for Pell but not so high as to be subject to the income cap,
at least over the initial years of the scholarship. Note that the relaxed income cap should have no influence on Pell enrollments
since the set of students for which the income cap was binding would not qualify for Pell assistance.
5 Singell and Stone (2002) found that the introduction of a merit-based scholarship program at a large public university yielded
a larger enrollment effect for relatively well-to-do students who could (academically and financially) choose to attend college
out of state.
6 Not having more detailed data also precludes the direct study of the attrition rates of needy students. For example, one might
surmise that those of lower ability are among the two-thirds of students who, after initially qualifying for HOPE, lose their
funding at the first checkpoint because of poor academic performance (for additional discussion, see Dee and Jackson 1999).
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on both enrollment and average Pell awards, each of which may vary asymmetrically with selectivity,
total revenue responses are also examined separately in section 4.
3. Empirical Analysis of Pell and Non-Pell Enrollments
Sample Data and Preliminary Enrollment Specifications
We draw from two main data sources to address the testable implications above: the IPEDS and
institution-specific Pell award data, covering the period from 1988 through 1997, provided by the
U.S. Department of Education.7 While one could argue that the sample years are chosen to evenly
span the introduction of HOPE, it is also the case that other state-sponsored merit programs proliferate
after 1997, which may compromise the integrity of the control group and difference-in-difference
estimation. While the potential observations are the entire population of colleges and universities in
the United States, we restrict our analysis to the southern U.S. states, which form a reasonable control
group against which we measure the effects of HOPE on needy students, following the existing
literature studying the effects of Georgia’s HOPE scholarship (e.g., Dynarski 2004; Cornwell,
Mustard, and Sridhar 2006). Since we are focused on the merit-based nature of HOPE, we discard
non–degree-granting programs and define the sample as nonprofit institutions that offer at least an
associate’s degree.8 Subject to these conditions, discarding missing observations, and restricting the
sample to those institutions with complete observations in at least three years before and three years
after the introduction of HOPE, we analyze a sample of 7432 observations from 759 institutions in
15 southern states. State-level attributes are incorporated using U.S. Census data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Southern Regional Education Board.9
Sample characteristics are reported in Table 1 and generally suggest that enrollments increased
in Georgia with the introduction of HOPE relative to the other southern states. Specifically, total and
Pell enrollment increased 10.1% and 24.4% from the pre- to the post-HOPE period in Georgia,
respectively, whereas total and Pell enrollment growth was 3.2% and 12.1% in the other southern
states. At the same time, average Pell awards fell in Georgia by 6.2% in the post- versus pre-HOPE
period, compared with a 2.6% decline in the other southern states. Jointly, these results suggest that,
7 IPEDS data are available from the National Center for Educational Statistics at nces.ed.gov.
8 The HOPE grant, which applies to nondegree programs at two-year and less than two-year schools, has no merit requirement.
Thus, our sample implies that the results cannot be explained by the presence of the HOPE grant.
9 The original merged data consist of 5670 institutions over the nine-year period from 1988 to 1997, for a total of 54,991
institution-year observations. Defining the control group for the Georgia HOPE scholarship as the states in the Southern
Regional Education Board (SREB) restricts our sample to 1797 institutions (17,317 observations), of which 1033 are nonprofit
institutions that offer at least an associate’s degree, which yields a sample of 9751. While missing observations on total
enrollment were imputed in some cases (167), imputing enrollment was not reasonable in 687 cases. These observations are
therefore discarded, as are 629 where freshman enrollment was unavailable. Of the remaining 8435 observations, the number of
Pell recipients enrolled was not reported (in 375 cases) or was reported as zero (in 15 cases). Naturally, these observations are
also discarded, as are an additional 81 cases where the reported number of Pell students exceeds the reported enrollment of the
institution. At this point the data consist of 7959 observations across 891 institutions. However, since our focus is on the effects
of the introduction of the Georgia HOPE scholarship, we ensure each institution’s existence for three years in the sample both
prior to and following the scholarship’s introduction. This leaves a sample size of 7432 observations over 759 institutions. The
discarded institutions are more likely to be smaller, two-year institutions. However, the average Pell awards reported to these
institutions are not significantly different from the sample retained for analysis. In considering the non-SREB institutions, there
are no differences in size or in Pell characteristics, but non-SREB institutions are more likely to be private (43% of the sample
are private in non-SREB while 35% of SREB are private) and less likely to be historically black colleges and universities
(HBCUs) (0.6% are HBCUs in non-SREB while 10% of SREB are HBCUs).
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although Pell enrollment was generally increasing in the South, the HOPE scholarship is associated
with a relative expansion of Pell enrollment that drew relatively less needy students into the Pell pro-
gram. The empirical analysis examines whether this relative change in the number and need of
Pell students remains after conditioning on all factors that might be expected to explain college
enrollments.
Given existing literature, a natural point of departure for the analysis would be to model
freshman Pell enrollment (e.g., Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 2006). However, the U.S. Department
of Education has no record of Pell enrollments by class for the years surrounding the introduction of
Georgia’s HOPE scholarship. Thus, to speak to the potential effects of aggregation, we model levels
of freshman enrollment, Fit, and total enrollment across all undergraduate classes, Tit. In particular,
before we turn to test the above predictions we model
ln Fit ¼ aFi þ cFt þ bFðHOPE3GAÞit þ kFXit þ eFit ð1Þ
and
ln Tit ¼ aTi þ cTt þ bTðHOPE3GAÞit þ kTXit þ eTit ; ð2Þ
for institution i in year t. In Equations 1 and 2, ai and ct are institution and year fixed effects,
respectively, and Xit is a vector of state-level controls. Year effects are included in all specifications to
capture potential variation not otherwise held constant, and the institution fixed effects control for
time-invariant institutional characteristics. Following Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006), we
Table 1. Sample Characteristics: Georgia vs. Other Southern States
Independent Variable
Georgia Other Southern States
Pre HOPE Post HOPE Pre HOPE Post HOPE
Pell enrollment 766.7 1014.6 1070.2 1217.3
(670.1) (870.0) (1316.9) (1533.7)
Total enrollment 3068.4 3412.7 4262.4 4402.4
(3893.3) (4061.7) (5493.9) (5580.8)
Average Pell awards 136.2 128.2 133.6 130.2
(21.3) (18.0) (25.9) (16.6)
Total Pell revenue (10,000s) 107.8 133.7 146.7 161.5
(100.6) (121.7) (187.5) (212.4)
Two-year institution 0.332 0.323 0.447 0.443
(0.472) (0.468) (0.497) (0.497)
Selective institution 0.204 0.201 0.175 0.177
(0.403) (0.407) (0.380) (0.382)
Private (not-for-profit) institution 0.411 0.431 0.347 0.351
(0.493) (0.496) (0.476) (0.477)
Historically black institution 0.132 0.139 0.101 0.103
(0.339) (0.346) (0.301) (0.304)
Per capita personal income 17,652.4 18,731.2 17,228.0 18,065.9
(141.0) (536.8) (2224.0) (1987.5)
State population:
18 to 19 year olds
208,811.8 204,846.5 228,718.5 225,157.5
(7146.9) (7518.9) (155,532.2) (164,134.2)
Number high school
graduates, state
64,123.5 63,157.9 72,437.7 74,251.1
(3186.3) (1362.2) (47,944.0) (54,246.2)
Observations/number of institutions 280/58 288/58 3403/701 3460/701
Variable means (and standard errors) are presented for the sample of 759 institutions used in subsequent analysis, over
the period 1988 through 1997.
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control for per capita income, manufacturing wage, number of 18 and 19 year olds, and number of
high school graduates in the state. The results of estimating Equations 1 and 2 are presented in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.
In short, the estimated difference-in-difference coefficient in the institution-level fixed-effects
specification of Equation 1 suggests that HOPE increased freshman enrollment by 15%, while the use
of total enrollment, in Equation 2, yields a predicted 13% post-HOPE increase in enrollment. Thus,
bias introduced through such aggregation appears to be minimal. Further, since HOPE was only made
available to each year’s freshman class, the first three years of the HOPE scholarship necessarily
contribute only to a fraction of total enrollment, and the relative magnitudes of the estimated
coefficients are not surprising.
Pell versus Non-Pell Enrollments
Having established the robustness of the estimates to the use of total versus freshman
enrollments, we now turn to address the testable implications of section 2. Following
Equations 1 and 2, we estimate the following fixed-effects models of institution-level enrollment
by Pell status:
ln Pit ¼ aPi þ cPt þ bPðHOPE3GAÞit þ kPXit þ ePit ð3Þ
and
ln Nit ¼ aNi þ cNt þ bNðHOPE3GAÞit þ kNXit þ eNit ; ð4Þ
Table 2. Sensitivity of Freshman and Total Enrollments at Georgia Institutions with the Introduction
of the HOPE Scholarship
Independent Variable
log(Freshman
Enrollment) Overall
log(Total Enrollment)
Overall Pell Only Non-Pell Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HOPE 3 GA institution 0.141 0.123 0.179 0.088
(0.028)*** (0.012)*** (0.017)*** (0.019)***
log(per capita personal income) 0.188 0.127 1.511 0.726
(0.246) (0.110) (0.151)*** (0.168)***
log(mean weekly manufacturing wage) 0.170 0.073 0.632 0.105
(0.249) (0.111) (0.153)*** (0.170)
log(state population: 18 to 19 year olds) 0.807 0.153 0.730 0.515
(0.193)*** (0.086)* (0.118)*** (0.131)***
log(number high school graduates, state) 0.118 0.060 0.240 0.102
(0.077) (0.034)* (0.047)*** (0.052)*
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.125 4.738 23.282 5.628
(3.572) (1.590)*** (2.189)*** (2.433)**
Observations/number of institutions 7432/759 7432/759 7432/759 7432/759
R2 (within) 0.02 0.14 0.38 0.05
Coefficient estimates are from fixed-effects models controlling for institution-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent variables are log(enrollments), where enrollment means for columns 1 through 4 are 748, 4250, 3125, and 1125,
respectively. The sample period is 1988 through 1997.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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where Pit and Nit are number of Pell and non-Pell recipients registered at institution i in year t.
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The results of estimating Equations 3 and 4 are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.
The estimated coefficients on control variables offer some insights into differences between Pell
and non-Pell students. For example, a $1000 increase in per capita income in a state is associated with
a 1.5% reduction in Pell enrollment but increases non-Pell enrollment by 0.7%, suggesting that
increases in income reduce the number of students who are eligible for federal aid. A 1% increase in
the manufacturing wage increases the probability that Pell students attend college by approximately
0.6%, but yields no significant enrollment effect for non-Pell students. Higher manufacturing wages
may improve access of needy students if this sector is a primary employer of their parents, but higher
wages will not necessarily have this effect if they provide better prospects for entry-level jobs for low-
income high school graduates. Comparable to the findings of Card and Lemieux (2000) for overall
college enrollments, we find that a 1% increase in the number of 18 to 19 year olds reduces the
enrollment of Pell students by 0.7%, whereas a 1% increase in the number of high school graduates
increases Pell enrollment by 0.3%.
With respect to our variable of interest, columns 3 and 4 reveal significant asymmetries in the
estimated effect of HOPE’s introduction. Specifically, Georgia institutions realize an average 20%
increase in Pell enrollments in the four years following the introduction of HOPE. Thus, unlike prior
literature that shows little or no enrollment elasticity for needy students in response to need-based aid
(e.g., Hansen 1983; Kane 1995), we find a substantial enrollment response to the HOPE scholarship
for needy students. Further, while non-Pell enrollments respond by an average of 9%, our results
suggest that population-wide responses may hide significant asymmetry in responsiveness with
general effects being driven more by needy students.
Insofar as one interprets this empirical regularity in terms of a real enrollment effect—needy
students accessing college after HOPE when they may not have prior to HOPE—recall that
a generous merit-based scholarship would be expected to draw more low-income students into
college simply because needy students are more likely to be credit constrained and would have
a lower propensity to attend college without the aid guarantee and backfilling of HOPE to federal aid
programs such as Pell. On the other hand, because low-income students were required to complete
a FAFSA to be eligible for HOPE, the HOPE scholarship may have also induced some marginally
needy students who would have attended college without federal aid to apply and receive a Pell
award, which would reduce the predicted enrollment effect of HOPE for non-Pell students. Thus,
while certain marginally needy students who change status may contribute to more of an accounting
effect than an enrollment effect, the 11% difference between the observed enrollment effects for Pell
and non-Pell students is unlikely to be fully attributable to such status changes. In fact, the real
enrollment effect might be expected to be overstated for nonneedy versus needy students who are
relatively likely to be retained in Georgia by the HOPE scholarship (i.e., to change status from out-
of-state to in-state student). This is explored more directly in subsequent analyses of institution-level
award values and total Pell revenue.
10 While it would be natural to anticipate separate state controls, the fact that we control for all time-invariant charac-
teristics with institution fixed effects absorbs any state-specific level effects. Further, one might anticipate the inclusion
of HOPEt itself. However, by fitting the model with separate year indicators, we have already absorbed potential level
effects in posttreatment years. We note, however, that restricting the year controls to be equal in posttreatment years (i.e.,
specifying the model as ai þ dHOPEt þ b(HOPE 3 GA)it þ kXt þ eit instead of ai þ ct þ b(HOPE 3 GA)it þ kXt þ eit,
which includes nine individual year dummies) yields comparable results, both qualitatively and in terms of measur-
able impact.
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Qualitative Differences in Enrollment Effects
While the substantial increase in needy-student enrollment is alone notable, the average effect
identified through the estimation of Pell enrollments hides the potential for differential Pell enrollment
responses across Georgia schools. To expose any systematic enrollment responses across different
types of institutions, we first reestimate Equations 3 and 4 for four-year and two-year institutions.
Overall, the results in Table 3 continue to show that the enrollment effect of HOPE is significantly
larger for Pell than for non-Pell students. However, estimation results reveal systematic differences in
enrollment patterns at two- versus four-year institutions across Pell status.
For Pell students, in the five years subsequent to HOPE’s introduction, enrollment is 23% higher
at four-year Georgia institutions than at comparable southern institutions and 21% higher at two-year
institutions. On the other hand, difference-in-difference estimates for non-Pell students indicate a 10%
enrollment effect at four-year institutions and no significant effect at two-year schools. For non-Pell
enrollments, our findings are consistent with those in Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar (2006) for the
full population of college students, indicating no overall enrollment effect at two-year schools.
However, since our analysis affords the separation of Pell students from the total population of
enrollees, our results suggest that a very different response exists among needy students and that there
are potentially large effects among the needy at both four- and two-year institutions.
With the specific claim that HOPE may have given an advantage to both the academically and
financially able, the potential crowding effect across school quality may introduce ambiguity in the net
change in Pell enrollment at selective institutions. Given this, and the observed differences across the
four-year and two-year classification of institution, we further analyze the variation in enrollment
Table 3. Sensitivity of Enrollments at Georgia Institutions with the Introduction of the HOPE
Scholarship
Independent Variable
log(Pell Enrollment) log(Non-Pell Enrollment)
Four Year Two Year Four Year Two Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HOPE 3 GA institution 0.209 0.189 0.098 0.053
(0.018)*** (0.031)*** (0.022)*** (0.036)
log(per capita personal income) 1.725 0.891 0.924 0.454
(0.168)*** (0.241)*** (0.207)*** (0.276)
log(mean weekly manufacturing wage) 0.535 0.205 0.054 0.254
(0.164)*** (0.256) (0.202) (0.294)
log(state population: 18 to 19 year olds) 0.386 1.079 0.297 0.792
(0.130)*** (0.193)*** (0.160)* (0.221)***
log(number high school graduates, state) 0.226 0.190 0.008 0.234
(0.052)*** (0.076)** (0.064) (0.087)***
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 22.089 24.453 5.833 5.778
(2.369)*** (3.625)*** (2.915)** (4.161)
Observations/number of institutions 4190/427 3242/332 4190/427 3242/332
R2 (within) 0.28 0.55 0.08 0.03
Coefficient estimates are from fixed-effects models controlling for institution-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent variables are log(enrollments), where enrollment means for columns 1 through 4 are 1219, 1003, 3269, and 2938,
respectively. The sample period is 1988 through 1997.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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patterns across measures of quality. We assign Selectivei ¼ 1 to institution i where the entrance
requirements are reported as ‘‘very difficult’’ or ‘‘most difficult’’ in Peterson’s 1989 Guide to Four-
Year Colleges. In order to capture the potential for relative selectivity at a more local level, we also
augment Selectivei to equal one if institution i is at or above the 60th percentile within the state in any
one of the following indices: the percentage of incoming freshmen with math SAT scores above 500,
the percentage of incoming freshmen with verbal SAT scores above 500, or the percentage of
incoming freshmen with ACT scores above 21.11 In addition to allowing the effect of HOPE to differ
by selectivity, Table 4 reports enrollment responses to HOPE first for all four-year institutions and
then separately for public and private institutions.
Across all four-year institutions, the results of Table 4 confirm that both Pell and non-Pell
enrollment responses to HOPE are concentrated at less selective institutions. Overall, point estimates
suggest that while Pell enrollment increases by 31% at less selective four-year institutions, otherwise
similar but more selective institutions experience only a 7% increase (column 1). Likewise, however,
non-Pell enrollments exhibit a similar pattern, with less selective institutions increasing enrollment by
Table 4. Sensitivity of Enrollments at Georgia Four-Year Institutions with the Introduction of the
HOPE Scholarship
Independent Variable
log(Pell Enrollment) log(Non-Pell Enrollment)
Pooled Public Private Pooled Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HOPE 3 GA institution 0.269 0.333 0.188 0.124 0.042 0.229
(0.021)*** (0.020)*** (0.034)*** (0.025)*** (0.019)** (0.044)***
HOPE 3 GA institution 3
Selective
0.195 0.300 0.081 0.085 0.103 0.150
(0.035)*** (0.040)*** (0.052) (0.043)** (0.038)*** (0.068)**
log(per capita personal
income)
1.724 1.726 1.853 0.924 0.172 1.679
(0.167)*** (0.186)*** (0.253)*** (0.207)*** (0.179) (0.329)***
log(mean weekly
manufacturing wage)
0.535 0.768 0.312 0.054 0.388 0.145
(0.164)*** (0.173)*** (0.257) (0.202) (0.166)** (0.334)
log(state population:
18 to 19 year olds)
0.387 0.190 0.906 0.297 0.290 0.425
(0.129)*** (0.141) (0.200)*** (0.160)* (0.135)** (0.259)
log(number high school
graduates, state)
0.226 0.265 0.227 0.008 0.017 0.035
(0.052)*** (0.056)*** (0.080)*** (0.064) (0.053) (0.104)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 22.090 14.198 30.344 5.833 4.273 14.690
(2.360)*** (2.376)*** (3.847)*** (2.914)** (2.281)* (4.991)***
Observations/number
of institutions
4190/427 1792/180 2398/247 4190/427 1792/180 2398/247
R2 (within) 0.28 0.53 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.11
Coefficient estimates are from fixed-effects models controlling for institution-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent variables are log(enrollments), where enrollment means for columns 1 through 6 are 1219, 2232, 462, 3269, 6145,
and 1120, respectively. The sample period is 1988 through 1997.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
11 This simple rule was devised to limit school-specific subjectivity. The Appendix reports the institutions qualifying as
Selective ¼ 1 according to this rule. Results are generally robust to an alternative threshold (e.g., using the top 20% for
these measures).
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13% compared with 4% at more selective institutions (column 4). Separating institutions into public
and private universities reveals that overall enrollment responses are larger at public institutions—
27% at public institutions versus 16% at private institutions. With the slower and less generous
introduction of HOPE awards at four-year private institutions, it is not surprising that the Pell
enrollment response is smaller at private institutions.12 That non-Pell enrollments respond so strongly
at private institutions is somewhat surprising and may be evidence of financially able students moving
toward private institutions as the propensity for less financially able students to enroll in public
institutions increases (Table 4, column 2). On the other hand, to the general extent that there are any
significant increases in Pell and non-Pell enrollment at selective four-year institutions (i.e., the net
effect implied in columns 1 and 4), such increases are driven by selective private universities.
Overall, our analysis suggests a clear and systematic change in the distribution of Pell students
across institutions in Georgia associated with the introduction of the HOPE scholarship—a change
that is not seen in other southern states. The larger expansion in the number of Pell recipients at less
selective institutions likely reflects the greater capacity constraints at more selective institutions that
often have an applicant pool exceeding the number of possible enrollees for a given class. The joint
effect of capacity constraints along with greater incentive for top high school students to remain in
state for college is consistent with the significant shift in the enrollment of Pell recipients toward less
academically selective institutions. Thus, while the HOPE scholarship appears to have improved
access of Pell recipients even at the more selective schools, it has consequently induced greater
enrollment increases at less selective institutions. Moreover, the relative shift in enrollments toward
less selective schools is more pronounced for non-Pell students, suggesting that the HOPE scholarship
did not relatively disadvantage needy students at the best schools in Georgia.
Sensitivity of Enrollment Specifications
Throughout the analysis, sensitivity tests to the sample and the specification confirm the
robustness of the results. For example, we test for sample sensitivity by discarding other southern
states that introduced merit-based aid programs during our sample period, as in Dynarski (2004). In
particular, we discard 29 institutions (287 observations) in Arkansas (which introduced a merit-aid
program in 1991), 65 (639) in Mississippi (which began in 1996), and 32 (314) in Florida (which
began in 1997).13 In all cases, the qualitative conclusions are unchanged.
The enrollment models are specified following prior enrollment studies using similar data and
similar samples of institutions. Nonetheless, we also test the sensitivity of the results to our
specification. For example, specifications that include institution-specific tuition values or state-
specific unemployment rates, or that exclude the number of 18 to 19 year olds, each yield qualitatively
similar findings to those presented.14 We also repeat all specifications in Tables 3 and 4 with less
12 Specifically, payments to private university enrollees were $500 in 1993, $1000 in 1994, $1500 in 1995, and $3000 in 1996
and 1997.
13 Outside of New Mexico, which introduced merit aid in 1997, all of the merit-based aid programs were located in the SREB
during our sample period. For current statistics on merit offerings nationally, see www.ecs.org.
14 While IPEDS does include a cell for state appropriations, endowments, etc., these data are sufficiently incomplete that their
inclusion would seem to be excessively costly in other dimensions. For example, requiring that state appropriations be
reported forces us to discard a full one-third of the institutions in our reported sample. We did test the models with additional
institutional controls, however, and the reported results are robust to such controls, where available. With that said, for
reporting institutions, an analysis of the data reveals relatively little variation in the time series of such measures, which would
suggest that average differences are likely being picked up in the institution fixed effects currently included in the original
specifications.
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restricted models, which allow enrollments in institutions in states that share a border with Georgia to
differ from those that do not.15 These ‘‘border effect’’ specifications suggest that enrollment increases
observed in Georgia following HOPE should not be interpreted as drawing strongly from institutions
in neighboring states, for such institutions experience small increases in enrollments relative to the
remaining southern institutions. Nonetheless, the primary findings regarding the enrollment effects of
HOPE for Pell and non-Pell students in Georgia are unaltered by permitting border effects.
Likewise, given the potential sensitivity of difference-in-difference specifications to trends that
are specific to treatment or nontreatment groups, other specifications follow Dynarski (2004) in
including a Georgia-specific trend (i.e., a ‘‘pretreatment trend’’) to control for such differences. As in
Dynarski (2004), we find that pretreatment trends do not explain the observed effect of HOPE on
enrollment. We also follow Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) in accounting for the serial-
correlation problems associated with difference in difference estimation and the possible biases in
estimating the standard error around the effect of the HOPE scholarship. In particular, we ignore the
time series component in the estimation by calculating an average before and after the introduction of
the HOPE scholarship, and then we estimate the equations on this averaged outcome variable as a panel
of length two. Given the small standard errors across the variables of interest, our expectation was that
no coefficients would lose significance. This is indeed the case, and the qualitative results remain.
The qualitative conclusions are also robust to changes in theHOPEprogram that occurred during the
sample period. For example, after netting out variation in average enrollments (or award values) across
years or across institutions with the inclusion of year and institution fixed effects, our reported
specifications implicitly restrict the effect of HOPE in 1993 and 1994 to equal that in 1995, 1996, and
1997. However, with respect to Pell enrollments, one should not anticipate significant implications of the
1995 income cap removal, since this pertained only to nonneedy students who, with or without the
requirement to file, would not receive Pell assistance (e.g., the National Center for Education Statistics,
table 414, 1998, reports that 90% of student participants in the two largest federal aid programs, the
Stafford loan and the Pell grant, have family incomes below $40,000). Further, with data on Pell
enrollments not available by classwithin institutions (i.e., freshman, sophomore, etc.),wewould naturally
expect the effect of HOPE on Pell enrollments to appear higher in later years. In fact, without Pell
enrollments available by individual classes within institutions, one is unable to separately identify the
effect of such a change in policy.When analyzed, the data reveal a slight bump inGeorgiaPell enrollments
at four-year institutions after 1995, which we interpret as an artifact of using campus-wide enrollments.
We find no such bump at two-year institutions or in non-Pell enrollments, generally, and suggest that
this may be evidence that the income cap had an unperceivable effect on non-Pell enrollments.
4. Pell Dollar Allocations and the Georgia HOPE Scholarship
Average Pell Awards
Since increases in the number of Pell recipients in Georgia are consistent with HOPE having
changed the margin at which it is worthwhile to attend college, the ex post distribution of need among
Pell recipients and the corresponding dollar values of Pell support are also likely to have changed.
15 Our purpose in specifically allowing the border institutions to differ assumes that Georgia residents may, on average, find out-
of-state but neighboring institutions more attractive than those farther from home. If, for example, Georgia students are
attending institutions in Florida with higher frequency than those in West Virginia, HOPE may have differentially drawn
students back to Georgia from Florida (i.e., a border state).
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Thus, we apply the models in section 3 to an analysis of the average value of Pell awards to examine
the average need among Pell recipients at given institutions. As in the presentation of earlier results,
we again separate two-year from four-year institutions and distinguish between public and private
four-year institutions. Within four-year specifications, we also allow the effect of HOPE to differ by
selectivity in a manner similar to earlier specifications.
With respect to average Pell award values at institutions in Georgia relative to other southern
states, a pooled sample of institutions reveals that the average award value declines by 4.2% at less
selective institutions after HOPE and by 10.1% at selective institutions (Table 5, column 1). Overall,
pooled sample estimates suggest that HOPE may have drawn less needy students, who might not
otherwise have sought federal aid either because of uncertainty regarding the provision of aid or
because the level of expected support was insufficient to warrant the effort, into the pool of applicants.
This effect is most evident at two-year institutions, where HOPE is associated with a 13% decline in
average award value (column 5). However, subsequent specifications further reveal that average
award values also vary with HOPE differently at two- and four-year institutions. In fact, columns
2 through 4 in Table 5 reveal positive award value responses to HOPE at less selective four-year
institutions, both public and private. Further, among a sample of private institutions, point estimates
suggest that average award values are everywhere positively associated with HOPE, but lower at the
selective institutions among this class.
Table 5. Sensitivity of Average Pell Awards at Georgia Institutions with the Introduction of the
HOPE Scholarship
Independent Variable
All
Four Year
Two YearPooled Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HOPE 3 GA institution 0.043 0.033 0.029 0.030 0.129
(0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)***
HOPE 3 GA institution 3
Selective
0.064 0.047 0.071 0.023
(0.017)*** (0.010)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*
log(per capita personal income) 0.277 0.052 0.095 0.189 0.804
(0.065)*** (0.047) (0.059) (0.066)*** (0.104)***
log(mean weekly
manufacturing wage)
0.209 0.124 0.201 0.068 0.350
(0.066)*** (0.046)*** (0.055)*** (0.067) (0.111)***
log(state population: 18 to
19 year olds)
0.070 0.084 0.249 0.098 0.147
(0.051) (0.037)** (0.045)*** (0.052)* (0.083)*
log(number high school
graduates, state)
0.018 0.017 0.035 0.037 0.009
(0.020) (0.015) (0.018)** (0.021)* (0.033)
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 5.303 1.448 4.973 2.006 10.413
(0.948)*** (0.669)** (0.754)*** (1.000)** (1.563)***
Observations/number of
institutions
7432/759 4190/427 1792/180 2398/247 3242/332
R2 (within) 0.12 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.31
Coefficient estimates are from fixed-effects models controlling for institution-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent variables are log(Average Pell Award), with level means for columns 1 through 5 of $1319, $1445, $1441, $1448,
and $1157, respectively. The sample period is 1988 through 1997.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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Total Pell Revenue
The asymmetric responses found for both enrollment and average Pell awards imply that annual
Pell disbursements to institutions, which equals enrollment times the average Pell award, might also
respond likewise. Thus, the specification used to estimate enrollment and average Pell awards in
section 3 is also used to examine the response of annual institutional Pell revenues to HOPE,
reflecting its joint enrollment and level-of-aid effects. These results are presented in Table 6.
In considering the variation in total annual Pell disbursements to institutions associated with
HOPE, Table 6 reveals similar patterns, with two notable exceptions. First, while the average award
value at selective four-year institutions in Georgia declines (Table 5, column 2), Pell enrollment
responses at these same institutions are sufficiently large so that the total Pell revenue received is
6.1% higher following the introduction of HOPE (Table 6, column 2). However, analyzing public
and private institutions separately suggests that this net positive result is driven by private institutions,
since total Pell revenue collected by selective public institutions actually declines with HOPE,
although the effect is small in magnitude (column 3). A second exception to the pattern of average
award values is specific to two-year institutions, where enrollment responses are again large enough in
magnitude to yield a net positive effect of HOPE on total revenues. In particular, while average
awards decline by roughly 13% (Table 5, column 5), the 19% enrollment increase (Table 3, column 2)
Table 6. Sensitivity of Total Pell Revenue at Georgia Institutions with the Introduction of the
HOPE Scholarship
Independent Variable
All
Four Year
Two YearPooled Public Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HOPE 3 GA institution 0.184 0.302 0.362 0.218 0.060
(0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*
HOPE 3 GA institution 3
Selective
0.297 0.243 0.371 0.104
(0.046)*** (0.037)*** (0.043)*** (0.054)*
log(per capita personal income) 1.234 1.775 1.630 2.042 0.087
(0.176)*** (0.177)*** (0.200)*** (0.262)*** (0.268)
log(mean weekly
manufacturing wage)
0.842 0.411 0.567 0.244 0.555
(0.178)*** (0.173)** (0.186)*** (0.266) (0.286)*
log(state population: 18 to
19 year olds)
0.799 0.302 0.439 1.003 1.226
(0.137)*** (0.136)** (0.151)*** (0.206)*** (0.215)***
log(number high school
graduates, state)
0.258 0.210 0.300 0.190 0.199
(0.055)*** (0.054)*** (0.060)*** (0.082)** (0.084)**
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 17.972 20.642 9.225 32.349 14.040
(2.547)*** (2.489)*** (2.556)*** (3.972)*** (4.036)***
Observations/number
of institutions
7432/759 4190/427 1792/180 2398/247 3242/332
R2 (within) 0.28 0.22 0.44 0.17 0.55
Coefficient estimates are from fixed-effects models controlling for institution-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent variables are log(Total Pell Revenue), with level means (100,000s) for columns 1 through 5 of $15.2, $17.7, $32.4,
$6.8, and $11.8, respectively. The sample period is 1988 through 1997.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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yields a 6% net increase in total disbursements to the average two-year institution in Georgia, relative
to the control (Table 6, column 5).16
Overall, from a fiscal standpoint, the results are consistent with Georgia being able to leverage its
scholarship dollars with greater federal support. This leveraging effect is, nonetheless, concentrated
among two-year institutions and less selective four-year public institutions, where Pell students are
historically more likely to enroll, and at private four-year institutions, where students may be more
responsive to the offering of merit aid in Georgia.
The Effect of Race: An Analysis of Historically Black Colleges and Universities
Initially, our findings with regard to Pell enrollments and revenues might appear inconsistent
with other indirect evidence regarding the impact of the HOPE scholarship on low-income students.
Specifically, Dynarski (2000) used the CPS to show that the HOPE scholarship raised the probability
that white students enrolled in Georgia institutions by 12% relative to those in other southern states,
but had an insignificant (although positive) enrollment effect on African-American students. To the
extent that our direct measure of need (i.e., Pell status) correlates positively with minority status, that
African-American students appear less responsive may be viewed as contrary to our findings that
HOPE expanded enrollment among needy populations. Unfortunately, a direct examination of the
racial composition of Pell recipients is not possible, since the Pell data provide no indication of racial
demographic groups.
However, racial differences in the impact of the HOPE scholarship can be examined indirectly
by exploiting the patterns observed in a sample of historically black colleges and universities
(HBCUs). The enrollment results for Pell and non-Pell students, along with results for average Pell
awards and total Pell revenue, are reported for this sample of institutions in Table 7. Consistent with
our prior findings, Pell enrollments at HBCUs are more responsive to HOPE than are the enrollments
of nonneedy students. In particular, the number of Pell recipients increased by 15% at HBCUs in
Georgia in the post-HOPE period relative to HBCUs in other southern states, whereas the comparative
increase for non-Pell enrollment is insignificant. Thus, while we support the findings in Dynarski
(2000) insofar as non-Pell enrollments at HBCUs show no change with HOPE, our results do suggest
that HOPE had a positive enrollment impact on low-income African Americans.
Interestingly, HBCUs differ from the broader set of four-year institutions in Georgia, with the
effects of HOPE falling between those estimated for two- and four-year institutions in general. For
example, the point estimates in Table 7 indicate that average Pell awards did not change significantly in
the post-HOPE period relative to other southern states, as compared to a decline at two-year institutions
and increase at other four-year institutions. Nonetheless, tomore fully understand how andwhyAfrican-
American students andHBCUs appear to have benefited differently from theHOPE scholarship requires
further study using individual-level data with institutional information that are not currently available.
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
A stated goal of U.S. financial policy since the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act in 1944 has
been to ensure college access independent of need. Even so, federal support for need-based grants
16 The 1993 increase in the Pell cap might be expected to increase the average Pell award in all states but should not be expected
to affect our relative comparisons of the average Pell across states unless Georgia schools are more expensive than those in
other states (which they are not). In any case, the direction of the bias would work against our findings of a decrease in the
average Pell award after HOPE.
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and loans has not kept pace with the rising cost of college over several decades, and rising
competition within higher education has led to greater reliance by states and universities on merit-
based aid to attract and retain the best college students. Consequently, subsidized, need-based aid
has become a decreasing share of the average financial aid package, and there is increasing concern
among higher education administrators and policy makers that needy students do not have access
to a college education. Nonetheless, few studies have examined whether the adoption of broad-
based, merit-aid programs work with or against the universal college access objectives of need-based
programs.
In this paper, we exploit the 1993 introduction of the Georgia HOPE scholarship, which paid
tuition, fee, and book expenses for all Georgia high school graduates who earned at least a 3.0 grade
point average, to study how merit aid affects the college access of Pell and non-Pell students in
Georgia relative to other southern states. Specifically, new institution-level data on the number of Pell
students and their level of assistance are merged with institution-specific and state-level data drawn
primarily from the IPEDS data available on the National Center for Educational Statistics Web site for
the years 1988 thorough 1997. These data are used to estimate the impact of the Georgia HOPE
scholarship on the number of Pell and non-Pell students and the average and total Pell award in
Georgia versus other southern institutions, controlling for time-varying institutional and state-specific
factors and conditioned on institution-level fixed effects.
The results provide some of the first formal evidence that broad-based increases in merit aid can
Table 7. Sensitivity of Enrollments at Georgia HBCUs with the Introduction of the HOPE
Scholarship
Independent Variable
HBCU Enrollment Revenue
log(Pell
Enrollment)
log(Non-Pell
Enrollment)
log(Average
Pell Award)
log(Total
Pell Revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HOPE 3 GA institution 0.150 0.071 0.020 0.130
(0.043)*** (0.077) (0.013) (0.043)***
log(per capita personal income) 1.886 0.376 0.154 1.732
(0.447)*** (0.806) (0.139) (0.452)***
log(mean weekly
manufacturing wage)
0.250 0.105 0.041 0.291
(0.465) (0.838) (0.145) (0.470)
log(state population: 18 to
19 year olds)
0.533 0.241 0.147 0.386
(0.338) (0.609) (0.105) (0.342)
log(number high school
graduates, state)
0.470 0.098 0.118 0.589
(0.143)*** (0.258) (0.045)*** (0.145)***
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 38.154 0.073 3.513 34.641
(6.021)*** (10.859) (1.873)* (6.090)***
Observations/number
of institutions 778/81 778/81 778/81 778/81
R2 (within) 0.19 0.12 0.38 0.16
Coefficient estimates are from fixed-effects models controlling for institution-specific unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent variables in columns 1 and 2 have mean values (not logged) of 1390 and 1141. Dependent variables in columns 3 and
4 have mean values (not logged) of $1522 and $2,202,605. The sample period is 1988 through 1997.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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improve the college access of needy students but also suggest that the institution-specific increases in
the number of Pell recipients and total Pell receipts are concentrated among two-year and less
selective four-year institutions. Therefore, while the HOPE scholarship successfully achieves its stated
intent of retaining the most able students in Georgia (e.g., Cornwell and Mustard 2002), the data do
not suggest that HOPE harms the opportunities of Pell students at the most selective institutions.
In fact, needy students seem to have benefited with the introduction of merit aid in a similar way as
more financially able students. The apparent beneficial effects of the HOPE scholarship on needy
students might be expected to be even larger with the administrative rule change in 2000 that no
longer reduces the scholarship award dollar per dollar with Pell. On the other hand, as of 2001, low-
income students are no longer required to complete the FAFSA in order to receive HOPE. It follows
that low-income Georgia students face a reduced incentive to participate in the Pell program, which
might well change the mix of students who are deemed to be needy and the apparent ability of the
state to leverage state dollars with federal dollars. Thus, the long-term effects of the Georgia HOPE
scholarship on needy students cannot be safely speculated.
While we provide the first step in studying how a state-specific merit-aid program may affect the
college access of needy students, the broader fiscal effects suggest that the allocation of Pell dollars
across the population of institutions may well be zero sum. Thus, as the trend toward merit aid
continues, with 20 such programs in existence by 2005, the general-equilibrium effects are an
important avenue of future research.
Appendix
Institutions in Southern States for which Selective ¼ 1
ALABAMA
AUBURN UNIVERSITY
HUNTINGDON COLLEGE
SAMFORD UNIVERSITY
SOUTHEASTERN BIBLE COLLEGE
SPRING HILL COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA—HUNTSVILLE
ARKANSAS
ARKANSAS COLLEGE
HARDING UNIVERSITY
JOHN BROWN UNIVERSITY
LYON COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS—FAYETTEVILLE
FLORIDA
EMBRY RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
ROLLINS COLLEGE
STETSON UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA
GEORGIA
BERRY COLLEGE
EMORY UNIVERSITY
GEORGIA COLLEGE
GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
MERCER UNIVERSITY
OGLETHORPE UNIVERSITY
SAVANNAH COLLEGE OF ART AND DESIGN
SHORTER COLLEGE
SOUTHERN COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY
SPELMAN COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
WESLEYAN COLLEGE
KENTUCKY
ASBURY COLLEGE
GEORGETOWN COLLEGE
KENTUCKY WESLEYAN COLLEGE
THOMAS MORE COLLEGE
TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY
LOUISIANA
CENTENARY COLLEGE OF LOUISIANA
LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA
UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS
MARYLAND
GOUCHER COLLEGE
HOOD COLLEGE
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
LOYOLA COLLEGE
ST. MARY’S COLLEGE OF MARYLAND
UNIVERSITY MARYLAND—COLLEGE PARK
UNIVERSITY MARYLAND—BALTIMORE COUNTY
WASHINGTON COLLEGE
MISSISSIPPI
BELHAVEN COLLEGE
DELTA STATE UNIVERSITY
MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI
NORTH CAROLINA
APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY
CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY
CATAWBA COLLEGE
DUKE UNIVERSITY
GUILFORD COLLEGE
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HIGH POINT UNIVERSITY
LENOIR-RHYNE COLLEGE
MARS HILL COLLEGE
METHODIST COLLEGE
NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY—RALEIGH
QUEENS COLLEGE
SALEM COLLEGE
ST. ANDREWS PRESBYTERIAN COLLEGE
ST. AUGUSTINES COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF NC—ASHEVILLE
UNIVERSITY OF NC—CHAPEL HILL
UNIVERSITY OF NC—CHARLOTTE
UNIVERSITY OF NC—GREENSBORO
UNIVERSITY OF NC—WILMINGTON
WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY
OKLAHOMA
OKLAHOMA BAPTIST UNIVERSITY
OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY
OKLAHOMA PANHANDLE STATE UNIVERSITY
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIV—AGR/APPL SCI
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
UNIVERSITY OF SCI & ARTS OF OKLAHOMA
UNIVERSITY OF TULSA
SOUTH CAROLINA
CITADEL THE MILITARY COLLEGE
CLEMSON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF CHARLESTON
CONVERSE COLLEGE
FURMAN UNIVERSITY
PRESBYTERIAN COLLEGE
TENNESSEE
BELMONT COLLEGE
BELMONT UNIVERSITY
CHRISTIAN BROTHERS COLLEGE
CHRISTIAN BROTHERS UNIVERSITY
DAVID LIPSCOMB UNIVERSITY
KING COLLEGE
LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
MARYVILLE COLLEGE
MEMPHIS STATE UNIVERSITY
MILLIGAN COLLEGE
TENNESSEE TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
UNION UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
TEXAS
BAYLOR UNIVERSITY
DALLAS CHRISTIAN COLLEGE
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HARDIN SIMMONS UNIVERSITY
HOUSTON BAPTIST UNIVERSITY
INCARNATE WORD COLLEGE
LETOURNEAU UNIVERSITY
RICE UNIVERSITY
SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY
ST. EDWARDS UNIVERSITY
ST. MARY’S UNIVERSITY OF SAN ANTONIO
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY
TEXAS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
TRINITY UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY OF DALLAS
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON—UNIVERSITY PARK
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS—ARLINGTON
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS—AUSTIN
UNIVERSITY OF THE INCARNATE WORD
VIRGINIA
COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY
EASTERN MENNONITE COLLEGE
EASTERN MENNONITE UNIVERSITY
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY
JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY
LYNCHBURG COLLEGE
MARY WASHINGTON COLLEGE
RANDOLPH-MACON WOMAN’S COLLEGE
ROANOKE COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
VIRGINIA POLYTECH INST & STATE UNIVERSITY
WEST VIRGINIA
SHEPHERD COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF CHARLESTON
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY
WEST VIRGINIA WESLEYAN COLLEGE
WHEELING COLLEGE
WHEELING JESUIT COLLEGE
Selective ¼ 1 if institution i is above the 60th percentile (within state) in any one the following indices: the
percentage of incoming freshmen with math SAT scores above 500, the percentage of incoming freshmen with verbal SAT
scores above 500, or the percentage of incoming freshmen with ACT scores above 21. Alternatively, institutions are
assigned Selective ¼ 1 where the entrance requirements are reported ‘‘very difficult’’ or ‘‘most difficult’’ in Peterson’s 1989
Guide to Four-Year Colleges.
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